

**Socio-Economic Impacts of Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria: Implications
for Counselling**

By

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Abstract

The study was a survey that identified the socio-economic impacts of Boko Haram, their sources of income and determined the relationship between Boko Haram and social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria. Target population of the study comprised of all the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in their government designated camps in Borno State. However, 2000 IDPs were used as sample for the study. Stratified random sampling technique was adopted in selecting the volunteer subjects. Researchers' authored open ended Structured Interview Schedule (S.I.S) was the instrument used in collecting data for the study. The instrument has a reliability coefficient of .88 and a validity index of .93 which was adjudged adequate and reliable for the study. Two research questions and two null-hypotheses guided the study. Statistical techniques of frequency counts, percentages and rank ordering were used in answering the research questions while t-test was adopted in testing the null-hypotheses at 0.05 alpha level. Findings of the study revealed depopulation, loss of properties, psychological trauma, agricultural trouncing and social disintegration as some of the socio-economic impacts of Boko Haram in Borno State. The null-hypothesis was not upheld as there was significant relationship between boko haram and social exclusion by gender in the study area. Based on findings of the study, prompt and positive interventions by the government at all levels, inter and intra national organizations, faith based and community leaders, national directorate of employment and the private sectors of the economy towards engaging the teaming and vibrant youths in vocational and other entrepreneurial skills, addressing the plights of the youths as well as counter narratives were some of the counselling implications proffered.

Keywords: Socio-economic, Boko Haram, Social Exclusion, Counselling Implications.

Introduction

Increasingly violent conflicts are proven evidences of the government inability to positively harness the potentials of the youths. This is understandable given the prominent functions demonstrated by the vibrant youths in violent conflicts as leaders, combatants, mobiliser and supporters of armed groups. Access to mass and social media, poverty, unemployment, substance abuse and gangsterism made youths vulnerable to being mobilized into insurgency in north-east, Nigeria. As trajectories, youths have been implicated in the perpetration of insurgency in the north-east. They have specifically been the foot soldiers and suicide bombers of the insurgency that is still oscillating in Borno State, Nigeria (Ngohi, 2016 and Ahmed, 2018).

Over the years, Boko Haram has evolved from an insignificant sect that waged poorly planned hit-and-run attacks on State Security establishments to one that increasingly mounts audacious attacks on diverse military, para-military and civilian targets. To curtail its operational capability, several counter insurgency measures were adopted by Nigerian government but to no avail as the insurgents continue to mount deadly and sometimes suicide attacks on their targeted individuals, private and public organizations thus making Nigeria especially the north-east sub-region a zone of serious security concerns for the inter and intra national communities and a subject of research interest for scholars focusing on terrorism and violent extremism (Onuoha, 2014).

Although Boko Haram was incubated in Borno State from around the mid-1990s, very little academic and security attention was paid to it until July, 2009 when it engaged security operatives in a foremost uprising in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States, Nigeria. The revolt seems to have been ended when it's charismatic leader and founder Mohammed Yusuf was finally captured and later brutally murdered by Police. However, the most common account of the origin of Boko Haram offered by the local and foreign media traces it to 2002 while to the intelligence community in Nigeria, its true historical root harks back to 1995, when Abubakar Lawan established the *Ahlulsunna wal-jama'ah hijra* or the *Shabaab* group (Muslim Youths Organization) in Maiduguri the Borno State Capital. The group flourished as a non-violent movement until 2002 when Mohammed Yusuf assumed the mantle of leadership. Name of the Boko Haram sect metamorphosed severally but the most accepted by the group is *Jama'atu Ahlulsunna Lidda'awati wal Jihad* (Ngohi, 2016).

Potentials of the youths exploited by the merchants of violence, economic sharks and political crocodiles for arms violence in the north-east geo-political zone identified by Ngohi (2015) include eagerness for activity, vibrancy, mental alertness, endurance, youthful exuberance and curious outlook. The reasons reported for youths' involvement in violence were lack of transparency in government, struggle for power, lack of visionary leadership, exposure to firearms, peer group influence, fraudulent electoral practices, poor parental upbringing/rearing, defective educational system, poverty, corruption, ethnic/religious sentiments, unemployment, influence of drugs, social inequality and cult activities. The types of arms/ammunitions used by the insurgents include locally made single and double barrel rifles, AK 47 and G3Rifles, 9mm and 7.62 x 39mm ammunitions, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) Bombs, English Barrel Pistols, grenades, rocket launchers and machetes (Ngohi, 2015).

Onuoha (2014) expressed that the events that occurred in 2009 are significant for understanding the current phase of Boko Haram particularly the cause of its grievance against Nigerian government. The group felt that the killing of their leader in police custody was unjust and extrajudicial thus vied to avenge the death of their leader and other members that perished in police sporadic shootings at Custom Area when the Corps of their member was taken to the cemetery at Gwange. Since then, the group's tactics evolved from simple and poorly planned open confrontations with State Security forces to increase use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), targeted assassinations, ambushes, shootings-aside, physical combats and suicide bombings. The devastating destructions caused by Boko Haram insurgents such as daily killings, bombings, kidnappings, destructions of private and public properties constituted some of the major socio-economic and security challenges that bedeviled Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States from 2009 up to 2014 which resulted in an impromptu and exodus movement of people out of their ancestral homes and the worst affected included the destitute, aged, women and children (Mustapha and Umara, 2015)

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Onuoha, 2014), expressed that as at January 30th, 2015, 981,416 persons were displaced, out of which 90% (868,235) were from north-eastern part of the country. United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2015) expressed that an estimated 192,000 Nigerians from the north-east escaped brutal killings by insurgents into neighboring countries of Niger, Cameroun and Chad. Over 74,000 took refuge in Northern Cameroun, 18,000 in South-West Chad and not fewer than 100,000 found refuge in Niger. According to Mustapha and Umara (2015), there were an estimated 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in and around the Lake-Chad region. Well over 2 million IDPs in Maiduguri and Jere local government areas are living either in State designated camps or with horst friends and relatives. Balarabe (2016) posited that the total number of IDPs in Borno State are more than the population of the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja) put together while Ngohi (2016) stated that 17,000 destitute, 42,000 orphans and 200,000 widows were registered by camp officials at 10 government designated camps in 2014 in Borno State, Nigeria.

Attempt towards managing the humanitarian crisis engendered by the insurgents resulted in the creation of 22 IDP Camps in the north-east in 2014 under the auspices of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). 12 of the camps were in Borno State designated in collaboration with the Borno State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and one each at Gombe and Adamawa States (Dlakwa, 2015). According to Kolo (2015), between June, 2014 and February, 2015 174,300 IDPs were registered by SEMA in the 12 designated camps at Jere and Maiduguri Metropolis. The camps include NYSC camp, EYN Wulari, Bakasi, State Hotel, MOGCOLIS (SHIS), Arabic Teachers' College, Dalori 1 & 11, Teachers' Village, Women Teachers' College, Yerwa Girls' College, Shehu Sanda Kyarimi 11 and Government College Camps. Balarabe (2016) however, added that the number of IDP Camps in Borno dramatically increased to 16 between February, 2015 and December, 2015. The added camps due to continuous nefarious activities of the insurgents include Farm Center, Madinatu, Goni Kachallari, Fori Primary School, Garba Buzu, Muna Garage and Khadamari.

Insurgency manifested in various forms however, between April 15, 2011 and October 23, 2015, office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was bombed in Maiduguri, on May 29, 2011 was the multiple bombing of markets, motor-parks and residential quarters in Maiduguri, Borno State killing over 70 people, on 26th June, 2011 bombing of social and relaxation centers in Maiduguri in which 25 people died. November 12, 2011 was a coordinated bombing and shooting attacks on police facilities in Potiskum and Damaturu in Yobe State, Nigeria in which over 150 human lives were lost, on April 30, 2012, suicide bomb blast hit commissioner's convoy in Taraba State, Nigeria killing over 10 people and about 40 sustained various degrees of injuries, in the night of September 16, 2013 was the bomb blast in school of agriculture, Yobe State killing over 60 innocent students, on April 14, 2014 was the abduction of over 200 innocent Chibok school girls in Borno State, Gombe State witnessed a bomb blast on 31st October, 2014 in the central Gombe Line bus station killing over 10 people and about 70 sustained various degrees of injuries. On the fateful day of November 7, 2014, Azare town, Bauchi State, Nigeria was occasioned by bomb blast killing over 10 human lives and numerous others sustained injuries, on November 10, 2014, suicide bombers bombed government secondary school Potiskum, Yobe State, Nigeria killing 59 innocent students, about 10 teachers and over 69 students were injured (Oladunjoye & Omemu, 2013 and Abdulasheed, Onuselogu & Obioma, 2015).

In the same vein, Hong town, Adamawa State, Nigeria was attacked by the insurgents killing over 40 innocent souls and numerous others were injured on November 15, 2014. The following day (16th November, 2014), Gombi town, Adamawa State was attacked by the insurgents killing no less than 40 human lives with nearly 30 people injured. On the 1st, 25th and 26th November, 2014 was suicide bomb blasts in Maiduguri Monday Market killing no less than 85 people and over 147 others injured. December 5th, 2014 was occasioned by insurgents' raid on Lafarge Cement Company, Ashaka with sporadic shootings in Gombe State, Nigeria. In December 7th, 2014, Lassa town in Borno State witnessed the abduction of 20 girls followed by the abduction of another 40 girls in a village near Chibok town on 18th December, 2014 (Joda & Abdulasheed, 2015 and Ajake, 2016).

On 19th and 21st December, 2014 the insurgents attacked Damagum and Geidam towns in Yobe State, Nigeria killing over 54 innocent people, injured nearly 100 others and destroyed private and public properties worth billions of naira. There was a suicide bomb blast in Dukku central car park in Gombe State killing not fewer than 28 people and 18 others were injured. Bauchi State central market experienced a coordinated suicide bomb blast on 22nd December, 2014 claiming 47 human lives and goods worth millions of naira were burnt. Another suicide bomb blast by a female insurgent attacked Maiduguri Monday Market on 10th January, 2015 killing only 4 people and injured 12 others. Bomb blast in Yobe State killed 2 policemen on duty on 12th January, 2015 and 3 people were killed outside Masjid in Gombe State, Nigeria on 13th January, 2015. The insurgents razed down over 80 houses in Gombi town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on 17th January, 2015 and not less than 80 innocent human lives were lost to the insurgents in Monguno town, Borno State, Nigeria following military repel on 25th January, 2015. Between 14th February and 23rd October, 2015 thousands of innocent lives were killed, hundreds of people were injured, private and public properties worth trillions of naira were destroyed in Adamawa,

Gombe and Yobe States, Nigeria by the Boko Haram insurgents through suicide bomb blasts rocking masjids, bus stations, markets and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps (Umar & Terhemba, 2014 and Sani, 2015).

In attempts to jettison the operational capabilities of the insurgents, Nigerian government adopted militarized counter-insurgency operations, which include legislative, prosecutorial, security, bilateral and multi-lateral initiatives. Notwithstanding federal government's efforts, the insurgents continue mounting intermittent and deadly attacks in the north-east geo-political zone. The insurgents consider all those that did not subscribe to their strict interpretations of Islam are regarded as disbelievers and wrong doers thus becoming legitimate subjects or targets of hard-hearted attacks (Onuoha, 2014). The vectors of violence oppose secular government, conventional banking, taxation, jurisprudence and specifically western education which they believe is morally unfounded, to impose their biased interpretation of Sharia in the fatherland. The irony however is that despite shunning away modern and western products, they do not abhor or refuse the use of motorcycles, cars, cell-phones, guns and other western innovations that aided their inhuman attacks (Ngohi, 2016).

The Boko Haram members come from diverse socio-economic, educational, religious and cultural backgrounds within and outside Nigeria. Initially, membership was based on interest which later transformed to membership by forceful recruitment through kidnappings and/or abductions irrespective of gender. Significant proportions of the foot soldiers were drawn from neighboring countries of Niger, Cameroun, Chad and Sudan (Ali, 2011). Like most terrorist groups, Boko Haram sustains its devastating operations through diverse sources of funding. However, four major financing streams stand out viz: Membership dues, donations, external funding and bank robberies (Onuoha, 2014). It is against this background that this study seeks to cast its searchlight on the socio-economic impacts of Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria with a view to advancing some implications for counselling.

Statement of the Problem

Boko Haram activities are continually gaining ground in Borno State despite the billions of naira released by the federal government towards eradicating their menace in the entire north-east geo-political zone. It seems the insurgents are multiplying in their potency and devastating activities signifying reinforcement in their financial muscles and numerical strength. The robustness with which the joint military (Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun) operations dismantled and crippled the insurgents has now given way for the Boko Haram sect to reconvene and re-strategize in the outskirts of Borno State been the epicenter of insurgency for a more vigorous attacks, bombings and killings. Although kidnapping/abduction forms an integral part of their forceful recruitment cannot be contested, knowing their devastating socio-economic impacts and sources of funding forms the major thrust of this study.

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of this study were to identify the:

1. Socio-economic impacts of Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria
2. Sources of funding of the Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria

3. Determine the relationship between Boko Haram and youths' social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria
4. Determine the relationship between Boko Haram and Politics in Borno State, Nigeria

Research Questions

The following research questions were answered in this study:

1. What are the socio-economic challenges of insecurity in Borno State, Nigeria?
2. What are the sources of funding of the Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria?

Hypothesis

The following null-hypotheses were tested in this study:

HO₁: There is no significant relationship between Boko Haram and youths' social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria.

HO₂: There is no significant relationship between Boko Haram and politics in Borno State, Nigeria.

Methodology

Design: The study adopted survey research design that identified the socio-economic impacts of Boko Haram, their sources of funding and determined the relationships between Boko Haram, social exclusion by gender and politics in Borno State, Nigeria.

Population and Sample: Target population of the study comprised of all IDPs in Borno State, Nigeria. However, 2000 IDPs selected from 4 government's designated camps by the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) in Jere Local Government area and Maiduguri Metropolis formed the sample.

Subjects and Selection Procedure: A stratified random sampling technique was adopted in selecting subjects from the volunteered respondents for the study. The stratification was based on gender, age, highest educational qualification, local government area of origin, occupation and marital status.

Instrument for Data Collection: Researchers' self-authored open ended Structured Interview Schedule (S.I.S) was used to elicit data for the study. The instrument was divided into two parts. Part "A" sought information on demographic characteristics of the respondents such as age, sex, marital status, occupation, home town and highest educational qualification while Part "B" elicited data on the socio-economic impacts and sources of funding for the Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria.

Validity of the Instrument: Face and content validity of the instrument was .93 as determined by 4 experts in the fields of Measurement and Evaluation and Counselling Psychology from the University of Maiduguri. Items in the instrument with less than 80% acceptance by the experts were removed. The experts' views were appropriately and adequately incorporated.

Reliability of the Instrument: Reliability of the instrument was established through pilot-testing among 100 IDPs in 2 camps outside the IDP Camps under study. The test-re-test method adopted using Cronbach alpha yield a reliability coefficient value of .88 which was considered suitable, adequate and adjudged appropriate for what the study purports to achieve.

Procedure for Data Collection: Copies of the instrument were administered by the researchers and two research assistants selected from amongst the camp officials at each of the sampled camps. Purpose of the study was explained to the IDPs and camp officials at each of the sampled camps prior to the commencement of data collection and that participation was voluntary thereafter, the responses were collected.

Data Analysis: The data collected from the subjects were analyzed using frequency counts and percentages. The responses were further ranked to give a pictorial view of the respondents' rating of each item on the instrument while t-test statistical method was used in testing the null-hypotheses at 0.05 alpha level. Two research questions and two null-hypotheses guided the study and the findings are presented in Tables 1 to 4.

Results

Research Question One: What are the socio-economic challenges of insecurity in Borno State, Nigeria?

Table 1: Socio-economic challenges of insecurity in Borno State, Nigeria

S/No.	Statement	Responses	Rank
1.	Depopulation	377 (18.85)	1 st
2.	Loss of Properties	377 (18.85)	1 st
3.	Psychological Trauma	377 (18.85)	1 st
4.	Social Disintegration	243 (12.15)	4 th
5.	Agricultural Trouncing	243 (12.15)	4 th
6.	Cultural Dislocation	198 (9.9)	6 th
7.	Educational Disruption	101 (5.05)	7 th
8.	Exposure to Ecological Hazards	84 (4.2)	8 th
Total		2000 (100.0)	

Note: All responses in parentheses are percentages of the raw scores.

Table 1 revealed that depopulation, loss of properties, psychological trauma and social disintegration ranked as the major socio-economic challenges of insecurity in Borno State, Nigeria while agricultural trouncing, cultural dislocation, educational disruption and exposure to ecological hazards ranked as the minor socio-economic challenges of insecurity in the study area.

Research Question Two: What are the sources of funding of the Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria?

Table 2: Sources of funding for the Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria

S/N	Sources	Responses	Rank
1.	External Financial Support	527 (26.35)	1 st
2.	Kidnapping/abduction	381 (19.05)	2 nd
3.	Bank Robbery	381 (19.05)	2 nd
4.	Transport Businesses	381 (19.05)	2 nd
5.	Membership Dues	208 (10.4)	5 th
6.	Donations	97 (4.85)	6 th
7.	Farming	25 (1.25)	7 th
Total		2000 (100.00)	

Note: All responses in parentheses are percentages of the raw scores.

Table 2 indicated that external financial supports, kidnapping/abduction, Bank robbery and transport businesses ranked the major sources of finance for the insurgents while membership dues, donations and farming ranked the least sources of finance for the Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria.

Hypotheses

HO₁: There is no significant relationship between Boko Haram and youths' social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria

Table 3: The t-test analysis on the relationship between Boko Haram and youths' social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria

Group	N	X	SD	DF	t-cal	t-crit	Decision
Male	800	5.24	0.37	126	2.69	1.42	NS
Female	1200	8.91	2.12				(0.05)

NS= Significant, $P \geq 0.05$

Table 3 indicated that significant relationship exists between Boko Haram and youths' social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria. This is evident because the calculated t-value (2.69) is greater than the critical t-value (1.42) at 0.05 alpha level. Hence, the null-hypothesis is not endorsed.

HO₂: There is no significant relationship between Boko Haram and politics in Borno State, Nigeria

Table 4: The t-test analysis on the relationship between Boko Haram and politics in Borno State, Nigeria

Group	N	X	SD	DF	t-cal	t-crit	Decision
Boko Haram	800	6.17	0.43	124	1.31	0.64	NS
Politics	1200	9.77	2.62				(0.05)

NS= Significant, $P \geq 0.05$

Table 4 revealed that significant relationship exists between Boko Haram and Politics in Borno State, Nigeria. This is evident because the calculated t-value (1.31) is greater than the critical t-value (0.64) at 0.05 alpha level. Thus, the null-hypothesis could not be upheld.

Discussion

Findings of this study revealed 8 socio-economic impacts and 7 sources of funding of the Boko Haram in Borno State been the epicenter of the insurgency in Nigeria. On research question one, the findings of this study corroborates earlier studies of Onuoha (2014), Ngohi (2015 and 2016), International Crisis Group (2014), Dlakwa (2015), Mustapha & Umara (2015) and Kolo (2015) who reported that millions of innocent citizens were killed by the insurgents, thousands were forced to flee their ancestral homes and some hundreds became orphans and widows in addition to those that sustained various degrees of terminal and recoverable injuries. Apart from the uncountable others that took refuge in neighboring countries of Chad, Cameroun and Niger, thousands were made to become refugees in their fatherland and took refuge in some government designated IDP camps and a few others took refuge with their close friends and relatives within the host community.

Studies (Umar & Terhemba, 2014; Kolo, 2015; Ngohi, 2016 and Balarabe, 2016) agrees with the findings of this study that loss of lives and properties (private and public), psychological trauma, loss of livestock, agricultural produce and farms, truncating educational activities, socio-cultural thrashing and exposure to famine comprised some of the hostile and unreceptive or intimidating socio-economic consequences of Boko Haram insurgency in the north-east, Nigeria. Kolo (2015) for example, stressed that the victims of insurgency are exposed to serious health issues bordering on undernourishment and the hazards of malaria among other ailments despite the billions of naira and dollars donated by national and international governments, nongovernmental organizations, bodies and agencies to alleviate sufferings of the Boko Haram victims.

On research question two, the findings of this study affirms the earlier studies of Onuoha (2014), Afolabi (2015) and Zakariya & Ado (2015) reported that the Boko Haram insurgents like other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Taliban have sources of financial supports for their extemporaneous, impromptu and debilitating attacks on their innocent victims. Some of the

sources of finance for the Boko Haram as identified by Onuoha (2014) and Afolabi (2015) were farming, internal contributions from friends and associates as well as membership dues however, these were their sources of finance at the onset or initial stage of marketing their lethal ambition and encouraging others to the toxic activity in the name of religion during which period, most of the registered members were sported in red, black, green and white turbans signifying their military, messengers, trustees and tutors in that order. As the Boko Haram membership (disciples) increases in number and strength, commercial transport systems such as motorcycles, tricycles, taxes and buses were used by members to enhance their economic or financial base. The Boko Haram leader and founder's connections with international extremists' groups expanded his sources of finance to include external financial support (plus arms) but with the killing of the leader and founder of the group, the Boko Haram under the new leaders expanded the scope of their finances to include Kidnapping/abduction and broad daylight bank robbery because other sources of their finance like farming, membership dues and transport businesses becomes no longer possible due to the catastrophic situation perpetrated by the insurgents.

On hypothesis one (HO_1), this study tested the null-hypothesis using t-test statistics at 0.05 alpha level. Finding of this study revealed a significant relationship between Boko Haram and social exclusion by gender in Borno State, Nigeria hence the assumption could not be upheld. This finding could not be divorced from the fact that deep economic and social activities are daily executed without involving the vibrant youths due to insensitivity of the government at all levels to the plights of the youths resulting in low human capital development and capacity buildings of the youths couple with abject poverty and lack of something worthwhile to do thus, the youths were disillusioned and become easy prey for Boko Haram engagements.

On null-hypothesis two (HO_2) tested using t-test statistics at 0.05 alpha level, finding of the study shows significant relationship between Boko Haram and politics in Borno State, Nigeria thus the assumption was not endorsed. This suggests that Boko Haram manipulated and was manipulated by its political sponsors in a love-hate relationship. Affirming the finding of this study, Akowi (2013) and Monguno (2013) expressed that it is on record that Governor Ali Modu Sheriff used Boko Haram to win elections of 2003, in exchange, followers of Mohammad Yusuf were rewarded as Alhaji Buji Foi was promoted and appointed Commissioner for Ministry of Religious Affairs and Abubakar Adam Kamar was released from jail where he was held for armed robbery.

Implications for Counselling

Based on findings of this study, the following implications were proffered: Boko Haram in Borno State, Nigeria has distressing and demoralizing socio-economic whitecaps or waves on the guiltless citizens and will remain immortal in the minds of those affected directly and indirectly. To drastically abridged the menace of Boko Haram and the resultant drawback, pathological or neurotic/obsessive home conditions should be detached such that parents could provide good and effective communication in the family, respect for each other's opinion, freely propagating fruitful information for family cohesion which would deter them from adapting negative ideas from peers, occupy them academically, spiritually and recreationally so as to make effective and productive use of their time. This becomes necessary because the devil finds work for the idle

hand. Counsellors should in collaboration with youth and women groups/leaders introduce community dialogue forums to sensitize and create awareness through counter narratives.

Counsellors should in collaboration with spiritual or faith based and community leaders, youths and women leaders, educationists, National Directorate of Employment (NDE), Bank of Industry (BOI), Ministry of Poverty Alleviation and the media (visual, blind and print) organize seminars, workshops and talkshops to the teaming youths with a view to sensitizing and exposing them to various entrepreneurial training skills and providing them soft loans/tools at the end of acquiring the basic skills to establish their means of livelihood. The Borno State government should in addition to constructing skills acquisition centers and counselling clinics, engage the services of certified counsellors with a view to providing behaviour modification therapy, vocational counselling and management of trauma on individual and group counselling basis, should also facilitate the inclusion of counselling in school curriculum at all levels and enhance/intensify rebuilding their burnt abodes, rehabilitating and prompt relocation of the IDPs to their various destinations so as to permanently arrest the IDPs' deplorable socio-economic condition. The Federal and Borno State governments should through Ministries of Foreign Affairs organize to repatriate victims of insurgency that took refuge in neighboring countries to be reintegrated with their families and love ones. Borno State government should meritoriously consider the plights of the vibrant and teaming youths with a view to eradicating abject poverty and all forms of low human capital development. The issues of social exclusions and gender stereotypes plus all other avenues that would create chances of making the vibrant youths vulnerable to being mobilized and implicated in perpetrating ferocity should be appropriately addressed by government at all levels.

Conclusion

Youths are not only vectors of Boko Haram as they in several contexts proven to be agents or ambassadors of peace. Relieving the myriad socio-economic impacts of Boko Haram on the innocent citizens of Borno State will require positive and prompt interventions of the government at all levels, inter and intra national organizations, bodies or agencies, philanthropists and numerous other none profit making economic sectors towards restoring the victims. The National Directorate of Employment should as a matter of urgency expand their scope to incorporate the victims with a view to helping them regain their losses. The private sector should equally extend their hands of fellowship in various vocations for apprenticeship. The insensitive nature of the government at all levels in addressing the plights of the teaming and vibrant youths should be avoided.

Recommendations

Based on findings of the study, the following recommendations were made:

1. Pathological home conditions should be avoided to allow effective communication within a family where personal opinions should be respected.
2. The Borno State government should in collaboration with NGOs, financial institutions and the business community provides the IDPs with entrepreneurial skills acquisition centers and as well provides the trained IDPs with soft loans to operate small scale businesses.

3. Children of the displaced persons should be provided with mobile schools, school uniforms and reading materials to catch-up with their peers in pursuance of education for self-reliance.
4. The counsellors should in collaboration with Ministries of education and information, agency for mass literacy and the orientation agency as well as the media organize workshops, talkshops, seminars, conferences and symposium at regular intervals to enlighten the victims on the consequences and management of psychological trauma and how to effectively cope with life through entrepreneurship.

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